The Import of History to Corporate Law by Tsuk Mitchell, Dalia
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 59 




The Import of History to Corporate Law 
Dalia Tsuk Mitchell 
George Washington University Law School, dtsuk@law.gwu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, The Import of History to Corporate Law, 59 St. Louis U. L.J. (2015). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol59/iss3/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
683 
THE IMPORT OF HISTORY TO CORPORATE LAW 
DALIA TSUK MITCHELL* 
INTRODUCTION 
Teaching directors’ duties has become increasingly perplexing. In a series 
of decisions beginning in the 1990s, the Delaware courts, attempting to infuse 
new meanings into traditional concepts—namely, good faith, due care, and 
loyalty—have left the terrain of directors’ duties in disarray.1 To make sense of 
rulings that appear inconsistent, one can take solace in Justice Holmes’s often-
repeated aphorism: “The life of law has not been logic; it has been 
experience.”2 In corporate law, experience shows that the courts’ changing 
views of directors’ duties reflect a broader shift—from a corporate law 
grounded in business practice to one anchored in, and ultimately trumped by, 
modern finance theory. 
In my Corporations class, I start the discussion of directors’ duties with the 
duty of loyalty—the authentic fiduciary obligation. We cover cases addressing 
self-dealing transactions, corporate opportunity, and executive compensation. 
We then proceed to the tort-based duty of care. We start with Francis v. United 
Jersey Bank3 or Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,4 which I 
discuss in this Article, to explore the tort and business origins of the duty of 
care. My class then turns to the business judgment rule, reading Kamin v. 
American Express Company5 and Joy v. North6 to explore justifications for the 
rule, and Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.7 to examine the relationship between 
 
* Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. 
 1. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 
55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 561–62 (2008). 
 2. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the law has 
not been logic; it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and 
political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which 
judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in 
determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a 
nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only 
the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.”) 
 3. 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981). 
 4. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
 5. 86 Misc. 2d 809 (1976). 
 6. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 7. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993). 
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the rule and the duty of care. The remainder of our discussion of directors’ 
duties is devoted to what I label the “dormant duty of care”—that is, what was 
left of the duty of care after the enactment of section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law.8 We examine the dormant duty of care in In re 
Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,9 In re Walt Disney 
Derivative Litigation,10 Stone v. Ritter,11 and In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder 
Derivative Litigation.12 Reading these cases in chronological order allows us to 
explore recent changes in Delaware law as well as the disorder they left 
behind. 
The evolution of the directors’ duty to monitor—from Graham to 
Caremark to Stone and Citigroup—is germane to our discussion of directors’ 
duties and Delaware’s law more broadly. In the second half of the twentieth 
century, the standard applicable to claims involving breach of the duty to 
monitor has shifted from negligence (in Graham) to business judgment to good 
faith (in Caremark), and the duty itself was altered from a subset of the duty of 
care (in Graham and Caremark) to a subcategory of the duty of loyalty (in 
Stone and Citigroup). The latter change is particularly perplexing but, as I 
suggest to my students, the broader historical shift from business to finance in 
which these decisions are situated might alleviate at least some of the 
confusion. As my class explores the influence of business practice in the mid-
century years,13 law’s emphasis on structure and process in the 1970s and 
1980s,14 and ultimately the triumph of finance over law in the 1990s,15 we 
examine how the rhetoric of care, business judgment, and good faith helped 
assure investors that they could trust their corporate managers while 
simultaneously rendering the duty to monitor (and the duty of care more 
broadly) inconsequential. Law’s role was reduced to enabling the development 
of powerful corporations, outside the law. 
This Article examines how I teach the development of the duty to monitor, 
but the themes I explore, divided into specific lessons (or parts in this Article), 
are not limited to the cases I discuss below. Drawing on business and legal 
theory, specifically different ideas about the role of the board of directors and 
finance, these lessons can be used to explain other changes in corporate law 
 
 8. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2014); see LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL & DALIA T. 
MITCHELL, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 277–360 (2d ed. 2011) (identifying and 
examining the dormant duty of care). 
 9. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 10. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 11. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
 12. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 13. See infra Part I. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
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beginning in the second half of the twentieth century and culminating at the 
turn of the twenty-first century. 
I.  GRAHAM AND MID-CENTURY MANAGERIALISM—THE INFLUENCE OF 
BUSINESS PRACTICE ON LEGAL DOCTRINE 
The modern discourse of directors’ duties begins with mid-century 
managerialism, an ideology that business theorists embraced amidst the 
growing decentralization of corporations and the development of complex 
managerial structures.16 Focusing on management’s expertise, business 
theorists and social scientists put corporate management at the center of the 
corporation, empowering management to control business affairs, to exercise 
authority over others in the corporate structure, and to use corporate power 
over those outside the firm.17 
By midcentury, the term “free enterprise”—in use since the 1930s—came 
to symbolize the free reign of managers, who in the cultural imagination 
replaced the small producers and entrepreneurs of the nineteenth century.18 In 
the post-war years, as “Marxist-inspired theoretical conceptualizations [were 
rendered] ideologically suspect,”19 not ownership of property or social status, 
but an ability to run an enterprise legitimized managers’ powers.20 The new 
managerial class was a loose class of leaders, presumably free from the 
constraints of the old world.21 For the most part, senior management faithfully 
carried on the responsibilities associated with their position.22 
Influenced by managerialist theories articulated by business scholars, mid-
century corporate law scholars, who lumped together directors and officers 
under the rubric of management, viewed managers as experts who, while “not 
amenable to direct shareholder control, nevertheless serve shareholder 
interests.”23 The “shareholder interest” was not determined by reference to 
 
 16. See, e.g., PETER F. DRUCKER, THE CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 41–71 (1972) (first 
published in 1946, examining General Motors’ complex managerial structure). 
 17. William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 
74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 413 (1989). 
 18. Cf. Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A Slave-Labor Law?, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 763, 
771 (1998) (explaining the use of the term “free enterprise” to describe the American capitalist 
system). 
 19. Rick Fantasia, From Class Consciousness to Culture, Action, and Social Organization, 
21 ANN. REV. SOC. 269 (1995). 
 20. Daniel Bell, The Power Elite—Reconsidered, 64 AM. J. SOC. 238, 247 (1958). 
 21. Davita Silfen Glasberg & Michael Schwartz, Ownership and Control of Corporations, 9 
ANN. REV. SOC. 311, 313 (1983). 
 22. Brian R. Cheffins, The Corporate Governance Movement, Banks and the Financial 
Crisis (Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 56/2013), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2365738. 
 23. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277, 
1307 (1984). 
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shareholders’ subjective, and potentially conflicting, desires. Rather, it was an 
“objectified abstraction” determined by “the bureaucratic managers” and 
“attributed to all shareholders of all corporations whether they want it or 
not.”24 Management had full discretion to determine the “shareholder interest,” 
while “shareholder interest” presumably constrained management’s power.25 
Reflecting this circularity of power and restraint, courts developed the 
presumption of the business judgment rule to allow corporate managers to run 
their businesses with little if any intervention from the shareholders.26 
The leading jurisdiction in the 1940s and 1950s was New York, where the 
courts, in an attempt to give more discretion to management, gradually allowed 
exemptions to directors’ liability to encroach upon the standard of care 
applicable to their actions.27 Earlier cases viewed the business judgment rule as 
“an adjunct to finding that diligence in the decision-making process had in fact 
been exercised.”28 If reasonable care was exercised in the decision-making 
process, a court would not examine “the merits of the decision” as that would 
involve assessing business judgment.29 In later cases, despite attempts to keep 
the duty of care alive, the business judgment rule gained a force of its own. It 
became a means of shielding directors from liability, of changing the standard 
of liability applicable to their actions. Not only honest mistakes but all actions, 
unless they were fraudulent or tainted with a conflict of interest, were exempt 
from liability.30 
Delaware’s history was different. By the time Graham came before the 
Supreme Court of Delaware, the court, fully embracing managerialism’s 
emphasis on directors’ discretion, had not yet developed the precepts of its 
duty of care jurisprudence but had a “‘business judgment’ jurisprudence” 
independent of that duty.31 Graham, a case involving directorial lack of 
monitoring, required the court to begin developing its duty of care 
jurisprudence as no business decision was made.32 As Lyman Johnson writes, 
Graham was the first Delaware case to “explicitly acknowledge” the duty of 
care.33 
 
 24. Id. at 1308. 
 25. Id. at 1306–07. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Status Bound: The Twentieth Century Evolution of Directors’ 
Liability, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 63, 113–23 (2009). 
 28. Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards 
and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 603 (1983). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Mitchell, supra note 27, at 119–20. 
 31. Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW. 625, 639 (2000). 
 32. Id. at 639. 
 33. Id. See also Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware 
Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 982–83 (1994) (“No Delaware court decision 
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Graham was a derivative suit against the directors of Allis-Chalmers 
Manufacturing Company for damages caused to the corporation by the non-
director employees’ and the corporation’s violations of antitrust regulations on 
a price-fixing conspiracy in the electrical equipment industry. The shareholder 
plaintiffs charged that the directors were liable for breach of their duties “by 
reason of their failure to take action designed to learn and prevent anti-trust 
activity on the part of any employees of Allis-Chalmers.”34 
The court, unable to defer to the board’s business judgment, treated 
Graham as a typical tort case using a negligence standard to evaluate directors’ 
inaction.35 Yet, a heightened standard did not result in stricter duties. 
Embracing the ideology of managerialism, the court stressed that Allis-
Chalmers Manufacturing Company was a highly decentralized corporation 
with authority delegated to the “lowest possible management level capable of 
fulfilling the delegated responsibility.”36 Given “the extent and complexity of 
the company’s operations,” the board’s role was limited to considering and 
deciding “matters concerning the general business policy of the company.”37 
Justice Wolcott did not see fault in such practice concluding that, due to the 
company’s structure, the board could not “consider in detail specific problems 
of the various divisions.”38 
The duties of Allis-Chalmers’ directors were “fixed by the nature of the 
enterprise which employed in excess of 30,000 persons and extended over a 
large geographical area.”39 Justice Wolcott accepted that “[b]y force of 
necessity,” the directors could not know all the company’s employees or be 
aware of their actions.40 “The very magnitude of the enterprise required them 
to confine their control to the broad policy decisions” and entitled them (by 
virtue also of section 141(f) of Delaware General Corporations Law) to rely on 
“summaries, reports, and corporate records.”41 Imposing a limited duty to 
respond rather than an affirmative duty to monitor, Justice Wolcott reasoned: 
“[D]irectors are entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of their 
 
espouses the existence of a director’s fiduciary duty to act in an informed manner and with the 
care of a prudent man until the decision of our separately constituted supreme court in 1963 in 
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.”). 
 34. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 127 (Del. 1963). These employees 
and the corporation entered guilty pleas to the antitrust indictments. Id. 
 35. Id. at 130. 
 36. Id. at 128. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Graham, 188 A.2d at 130. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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subordinates until something occurs to put them on suspicion that something is 
wrong.”42 
The history of finance helps explain how corporations and corporate law 
could so easily refuse to hold directors liable without any concern about 
potential repercussions from investors. Managerialism and its associated 
deference to directors’ expert judgment went hand in hand with reliance on 
internal finance, which shielded the control group from the discipline of the 
stock market and public shareholders. Corporations obtained external financing 
largely from banks with whom corporate management had close relationships 
and whose representatives often sat on corporate boards. Corporate 
management was running corporations for the sake of business, without 
undertaking unnecessary risks, and politicians did not wish to disturb 
American business during one of its greatest periods of expansion.43 
The business judgment rule, as it developed during the mid-century years, 
and the court’s decision in Graham reflected the dominant business practice 
and the managerialist theory that legitimated it. The following part (or lesson) 
explores developments taking place a couple of decades later when the legal 
community’s vision of the directors’ role and its financial underpinning was 
transformed, leading the courts to embrace the monitoring model of the board 
and to alter corporate law’s focus from business practice to finance. As my 
class explores, Caremark brought these changes to bear upon the duty to 
monitor. 
II.  THE 1970S AND 1980S REVOLUTION—FROM BUSINESS PRACTICE TO 
LEGAL STRUCTURES 
Beginning in the 1970s, the corporate board came to the forefront of 
academic and political debates—the focus of policymakers’ attention.44 Social 
and political upheavals led public-interest shareholder groups to use the SEC’s 
proxy and shareholder proposal rules to voice their opposition to corporate 
practices related to the Vietnam War, environmental protection, occupational 
safety, and equal employment. Institutional investors became major players in 
corporate governance, raising new questions about the control of corporate 
America. Several corporate bankruptcies, including the sudden and unexpected 
collapse of Penn Central, raised grave doubts about their boards’ performance, 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Lawrence E. Mitchell & Dalia T. Mitchell, The Financial Determinants of American 
Corporate Governance: A Brief History, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SYNTHESIS OF 
THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 19, 27–28 (H. Kent Baker and Ronald Anderson, eds., 
2010). 
 44. As an example of this growing attention, see Officers’ and Directors’ Responsibilities 
and Liabilities, BUS. LAW., Feb. 1972, at 1, 1–178. 
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while corporate scandals involving illegal political contributions revealed 
during the Watergate investigation exacerbated such doubts.45 
A variety of studies concluded that the boards of directors of large and 
medium-sized corporations were no longer a significant check on the CEO; 
they did not even have much say in selecting the executives because the proxy 
machinery was controlled by management. Outside directors were ineffective. 
They were typically chosen from the same social networks as the top 
executives and sitting with the latter on several boards; they were thus unlikely 
to challenge the executives. Finally, studies revealed that most boards did not 
meet frequently enough to perform a meaningful role.46 
Several proposals for reform followed,47 ultimately converging on the 
monitoring model of the board. It described directors as “overseers of the 
corporation and monitors of corporate management” and recommended that a 
significant number of outside directors serve on the board.48 But consensus 
was limited to the fact that independent directors should play an important role 
in reviewing the activities of the executives. What that meant as far as the 
duties and liabilities of directors, and to whom directors owed those duties, 
remained contested issues throughout the 1980s.49 
While some legal scholars wanted to use the monitoring model 
substantially to redefine directors’ duties,50 corporate lawyers and business 
groups were strongly opposed to any attempt to tinker with the very limited 
directorial duties. They focused on the monitoring role of non-management 
directors and suggested that good boards should have a specific number of 
 
 45. Joel Seligman, A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of 
Corporate Governance Project, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 325, 328–35 (1987). 
 46. Id. at 330–32. See also Horsey, supra note 33, at 991; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The 
Trouble with Boards, in PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 17, 29–30 (F. Scott Keiff 
& Troy A. Paredes eds., 2010) (noting, among others, the 1971 study by Myles Mace regarding 
corporate boards’ passivity). 
 47. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 
83 YALE L.J. 663, 701–03 (1974) (proposing the enactment of federal “minimum standards” for 
officers and directors of firms of a certain size); RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT 
CORPORATION 66, 76–77, 120, 126–27 (1976) (reintroducing the idea that firms of a certain 
income and employee-base should be federally incorporated; the federal statute was to include 
specific requirements regarding board composition and the board’s role); Harvey J. Goldschmid, 
The Greening of the Board Room: Reflections on Corporate Responsibility, 10 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 15, 25–26 (1973) (suggesting requiring boards to be composed entirely of outside 
directors who would review the executives’ decisions). 
 48. See, e.g., Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 32 BUS. LAW. 5, 31, 33 (1976) and its 
revised edition, Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 33 BUS. LAW. 1591, 1619, 1622–27 (1978) 
[hereinafter Corporate Director’s Guidebook II]. See also Seligman, supra note 45, at 341. 
 49. Mitchell, supra note 46, at 52. 
 50. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern 
Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375, 403–18 (1975). 
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them.51 Moreover, as the business community saw it, the monitoring board had 
one task—the directors’ role was “to monitor, in an environment of loyal but 
independent oversight, the conduct of the business and affairs of the 
corporation in behalf of those who invest in the corporation.”52 Directors were 
not to be representatives of different corporate constituencies. According to the 
business community and its lawyers, directors’ monitoring powers were meant 
to achieve share price maximization.53 
During the 1980s, the Delaware courts brought the legal community’s 
emphasis on independent oversight “to bear upon their analysis of directors’ 
duties and the business judgment rule.”54 Fully embracing the model as a 
structural rather than substantive one, the Delaware courts focused on the role 
of the independent directors (independence narrowly defined as lack of control 
or domination by an individual interested in the transaction).55 If a majority of 
independent disinterested directors, following the courts’ procedural 
requirements, approved the board’s actions, the courts declared such actions to 
be shielded from further judicial inquiry.56 
Delaware’s embrace of the monitoring model as a means of shielding 
directors from liability reached further. In Aronson v. Lewis, the Supreme 
Court of Delaware declared that the business judgment rule—“an 
acknowledgment of the managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors” —was 
 
 51. See, e.g., Corporate Director’s Guidebook II, supra note 48, at 1619, 1622. 
 52. Id. at 1621. 
 53. Mitchell, supra note 46, at 44–45. On the relationship between the monitoring board and 
share price maximization, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ 
Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 554–56 (1984); Ira M. Millstein & Paul 
W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded 
Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1292 (1998); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent 
Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1526–35 (2007). 
 54. Mitchell, supra note 27, at 138. 
 55. Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188–89 (Del. 1988). See also, Usha Rodrigues, The 
Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 465 (2008) (examining the Delaware courts’ 
inquiry into independence); Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A 
Director’s Duty of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1351 (1989) (advocating a director’s 
separate duty of independence). 
 56. Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (noting that when 
directors adopt a defensive tactic, their ability to fulfill their Unocal duties is “materially 
enhanced . . . where . . . a majority of the board favoring the proposal consisted of outside 
independent directors who have acted in accordance with the foregoing standards.”); Revlon, Inc. 
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 n.3 (Del. 1986) (“[C]ertain 
presumptions . . . generally attach to the decisions of a board whose majority consists of truly 
outside independent directors.”); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 
(Del. 1989) (noting that the evidence supporting the conclusion that in making its decision the 
Time’s board was not uninformed “is materially enhanced by the fact that twelve of Time’s 
sixteen board members were outside independent directors.”). 
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a presumption “that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief 
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”57 Placing the 
burden of rebutting the presumption on the party challenging the decision, the 
court held that “[a]bsent an abuse of discretion, [directors’] judgment will be 
respected by the courts.”58 The court further announced that “[w]hile the 
Delaware cases use a variety of terms to describe the applicable standard of 
care, our analysis satisfies us that under the business judgment rule director 
liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.”59 
The “informed” element was not part of the business judgment rule 
doctrine until Aronson introduced it. In adding it, Aronson laid the foundation 
for the ultimate equation of the substantive duty of care with the procedural (or 
structural) duty to be informed.60 Precedent also did not support the court’s 
conclusion that gross negligence was the standard of care applicable to 
directors.61 But a year later, in Smith v. Van Gorkom, the case that shocked the 
business and legal communities by finding directors liable for breach of the 
duty of care, the Supreme Court of Delaware confirmed its own proclamation 
in Aronson that “under the business judgment rule director liability is 
predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.”62 Moreover, the court in Van 
Gorkom concluded that “the concept of gross negligence is also the proper 
 
 57. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Johnson, supra note 31, at 641. According to Johnson, Aronson changed the traditional 
presumption that directors acted “in good faith” in the exercise of their best judgment “for what 
they believed to be the interest of the corporation” and all its stockholders into a presumption that 
“in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good 
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Id. at 
639–40. For the traditional formulation of the rule, see, e.g., Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp., 
140 A. 264, 267 (Del. 1927). 
 61. Samuel Arsht’s review of Delaware cases a few years before Aronson was decided 
revealed that most of the cases cited in Aronson dealt with “parent-subsidiary transactions where 
a determination of fairness is meaningless or impossible . . . .” In these situations, the courts had 
“characterize[ed] the ‘gross and palpable overreaching’ standard as a ‘business judgment’ test.” 
But, as Arsht demonstrated, this was not a generally applicable test. Other cases cited in Aronson 
simply stated that the court would not interfere with the board’s judgment absent evidence of 
fraud or gross abuse of discretion. One case suggested that directors might be liable for gross 
negligence, but did not negate the possibility of liability for negligence. S. Samuel Arsht, The 
Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 102, 112–13 (1980). Even the 
Delaware Supreme Court admitted that “the Delaware cases have not been precise in articulating 
the standard by which the exercise of business judgment is governed.” Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 
n.6. Nonetheless it chose to characterize the cases as “hold[ing] that director liability is predicated 
on a standard which is less exacting than simple negligence.” Id. 
 62. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). 
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standard for determining whether a business judgment reached by a board of 
directors was an informed one.”63 
The mid-century rule of deference to expert opinion had become in the 
1980s a structural procedural defense precluding judicial inquiry into the 
directors’ challenged actions. Unless a plaintiff arguing a breach of the duty of 
care could demonstrate that the directors were grossly negligent (that is, 
grossly negligent with respect to the requirement to be informed), the directors 
would have the presumption of the business judgment rule and the court would 
not second-guess their actions. The following parts (or lessons) explore how, 
by the time Caremark was decided, the presumption of the business judgment 
rule helped dissociate the high rhetoric surrounding the duty to monitor from 
potential liability. 
III.  AFTER THE REVOLUTION—THE DUTY TO MONITOR IN CAREMARK 
Caremark involved the settlement of a shareholders derivative suit to 
recover damages from Caremark’s directors for fines the corporation incurred 
in settling federal and state lawsuits addressing kickback payments that 
violated the terms of the Anti-Referral Payments Law. Invoking Graham, the 
plaintiff shareholder argued that the losses were a result of the board’s failure 
to monitor Caremark’s officers and employees.64 
Caremark International—a health care corporation—was a highly 
decentralized corporation with “approximately 7,000 employees and ninety 
branch operations.”65 Its size was not remarkable, though. Beginning in the 
1970s, U.S. publicly held corporations were growing larger. They were also 
“operating in a more volatile market environment due to deregulation, 
increased competition and technological advances reducing barriers to entry in 
many industries.”66 While such developments might have triggered closer 
scrutiny of the executives, the Delaware courts, as the following elaborates, 
saw matters differently. Shielding the board from liability, the courts 
empowered the executives to act without fearing intervention (or even 
monitoring) from their monitors. 
Chancellor Allen began his decision by emphasizing that, at the twentieth-
century’s end (more than three decades after Graham was decided), boards 
could not “satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the 
corporation, without assuring themselves that information and reporting 
systems exist in the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to 
senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate information” so that 
 
 63. Id. Interestingly, what “gross negligence” meant remained an open question. Rabkin v. 
Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 970 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
 64. In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 65. Id. at 962. 
 66. Cheffins, supra note 22, at 11. 
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the latter could “reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s 
compliance with law and its business performance.”67 Directors had an 
affirmative duty to ensure systematic monitoring.68 
High ideals of business practices did not support heightened duties. Just as 
Allen required directors to install reporting systems, he ensured that proving 
directors’ failure to act would be nearly impossible. Graham used a negligence 
standard to evaluate directors’ failure to monitor. But if, as Allen held, 
directors had an affirmative duty to design information and reporting systems, 
their decisions as to the appropriate reporting systems would be subject to the 
presumption of the business judgment rule and evaluated using a standard of 
gross negligence.69 Furthermore, because section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, which was enacted in 1986, allowed corporations to 
exculpate directors for monetary liability for breaches of the duty of care, but 
not for acting in bad faith, Allen substituted good faith for gross negligence. So 
long as the board exercised “a good faith judgment” as to the adequacy of the 
corporation’s information and reporting system, it could not be held liable for 
the system’s failure to reveal violations of law or duties by officers or 
employees.70 
Relying on good faith to replace both the duty of care and the business 
judgment rule, Allen stressed that the standard of good faith did not require an 
assessment of the substance of the board’s decision. “[C]ompliance with a 
director’s duty of care[,]” Allen wrote, “can never appropriately be judicially 
determined by reference to the content of the board decision that leads to a 
corporate loss, apart from consideration of the good faith or rationality of the 
process employed.”71 After-the-fact determinations that the decision was 
“substantively wrong,” “stupid,” “egregious,” or “irrational” did not entail 
liability.72 Rather, the standard of good faith required a determination by the 
court that the process in which a compliance system was adopted “was either 
rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests.”73 
“[O]nly a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—
such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and 
reporting system exi[s]ts—will establish the lack of good faith that is a 
necessary condition to liability.”74 
 
 67. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 969–71. 
 70. Id. at 970–71. 
 71. Id. at 967. 
 72. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 971. For examinations of good faith, see Sarah Helene Duggin & Stephen M. 
Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate Directors: The Disney Standard and the ‘New’ Good 
Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 232–37 (2006); Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good 
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The tort based duty of care, subsumed first under the business judgment 
rule and now under good faith, was no longer relevant. In a footnote, Allen put 
it to sleep. “The vocabulary of negligence while often employed,” he noted, “is 
not well-suited to judicial review of board attentiveness,” especially, albeit not 
only, if such usage implies looking at “the substance of the decision as any 
evidence of possible ‘negligence.’”75 A substantive standard of care no longer 
attached to the directors’ duty of care or their duty to monitor. As long as 
directors, insiders and outsiders alike, did not consciously disregard their 
duties, the Delaware courts would not reevaluate their decisions or lack 
thereof. The monitoring board’s duty to monitor became merely rhetorical. 
How could rhetoric so easily be separated from duties, ideals from 
practice, without triggering investors’ irk? The following part (or lesson) 
explores how Delaware’s analysis in the last decades of the twentieth century, 
as exhibited in Caremark, limited the shareholders’ interests to the 
maximization of profit. Shareholders were instructed to find security neither in 
business practice nor in the structure of the board and its decision-making 
processes, but in finance. 
IV.  FROM BUSINESS PRACTICE, THROUGH STRUCTURE, TO FINANCE 
A rule of deference to the directors’ expert judgment, as articulated in 
Graham, seemed to fit a time when corporations (and directors) relied on 
internal finance. The monitoring model of the board was established on a very 
different financial background—one in which public stock ownership, 
especially institutional ownership, was steadily increasing. By 1965, more than 
ten percent of the population owned stock. In 2002, more than twenty-nine 
percent of the total population directly owned stock. In 1950, institutional 
investors held approximately eight percent of equities. Four decades later, 
institutions held more than forty-five percent of total equities in the United 
States.76 
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Directors were no longer seen as entrusted with the task of making expert 
business decisions. Rather, they were deemed responsible for maximizing 
value for the shareholders. Takeovers, stock buybacks, and leverage became 
management’s means of satisfying stock price appreciation, and 
stockholders—especially institutional shareholders—demanded it. 
Corporations were using their retained earnings and debt to return value to 
shareholders, to defend against hostile tender offers, or to finance takeovers. 
From its highs of the mid-century, internal finance gradually dropped, reaching 
the teens in the 1990s. Debt replaced retained earnings as corporations’ main 
means of finance, while the stock market was becoming the principal governor 
of corporate behavior and stock price appreciation—an end in and of itself.77 
Seeking to constrain market demands, and perhaps stabilize a rapidly 
volatile stock market, progressive corporate jurists proposed allowing different 
stakeholders, as well as the community at large, to make demands on 
corporations and their managers.78 As my class explores, the Delaware courts 
(and legislature) chose a different course, enabling directors and officers to 
exercise their power without limits. In cases addressing creditors’ attempts to 
hold directors liable for harm to their investments, courts used the language of 
contracts to absolve directors from accountability to creditors, attaching 
fiduciary obligations to proprietary interests.79 At the same time, as I elaborate 
below, while promising shareholders stock price maximization, the courts 
relied on the rhetoric of risk and return to justify shielding directors from 
liability to their shareholders, making it nearly impossible even for activist 
shareholders to hold management accountable. 
Modern portfolio theory and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”), 
both developed in the 1950s and 1960s, helped shift academic focus from 
business fundamentals to the investors’ ability to diversify risks inherent in 
particular companies (nonsystematic risks) and risks affecting the market as a 
whole (systematic risks). Rather than focus on the fundamentals of companies 
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in which they invested, investors were advised to study the historical 
performance of their companies’ stock price.80 
The judiciary’s embrace of CAPM happened concurrently with the 
development of mutual funds and the rapid growth in institutional investors’ 
stock ownership. In Joy v. North, Judge Winter, writing for the Second Circuit, 
turned to the rhetoric of risk to justify the business judgment rule.81 Winter 
reasoned that shareholders voluntarily assumed the risks of business failures 
(and the potential for their success). Because rational shareholders would offset 
their exposure to business misfortunes by diversifying their portfolios (as 
modern finance theory dictated), corporate law did not need to protect them 
from such letdowns.82 
The Delaware courts, too, embraced the idea that the maximization of 
stock price was the shared goal of rational investors who, as portfolio theory 
suggested, could use diversification to defend against investment risks.83 Take, 
for example, Gagliardi v. TriFoods International, Inc., a case referenced in 
Caremark.84 Shareholders, Chancellor Allen wrote in Gagliardi, “can diversify 
the risks of their corporate investments.”85 It was “[t]hus in their economic 
interest for the corporation to accept in rank order all positive net present value 
investment projects available to the corporation, starting with the highest risk 
adjusted rate of return first.”86 Given that making risky investments was in the 
rational investor’s best interests, it was also 
in the shareholders' economic interest to offer sufficient protection to directors 
from liability for negligence, etc., to allow directors to conclude that, as a 
practical matter, there is no risk that, if they act in good faith and meet minimal 
proceduralist standards of attention, they can face liability as a result of a 
business loss.87 
While Graham addressed directors’ duties by looking at the fundamentals 
of the particular corporation, Allen’s analysis in Gagliardi and Caremark 
emphasized the need to allow directors to take risks to offer higher 
appreciation for their stockholders and the ability of different investors to 
protect themselves. The rhetoric of risk and return was employed to justify 
protecting directors from liability. 
 
 80. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
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In short, as the Delaware courts declared that the duty to monitor, and the 
duty of care more broadly, could no longer be assessed by reference to 
substantive, business-specific risks, they helped make the stock market the 
predominant tool of evaluating directors’ actions and inactions. Appropriate 
risks were to be assessed in relationship to stock-value maximization. 
Corporations, Allen pronounced, should be free to take risks. If directors (and 
officers) 
in charge of the corporation are to be adjudged personally liable for losses on 
the basis of a substantive judgment based upon what [] persons of ordinary or 
average judgment and average risk assessment talent regard as ‘prudent’ 
‘sensible’ or even ‘rational’, such persons will have a strong incentive at the 
margin to authorize less risky investment projects.88 
It was a subtle, albeit significant, transition from a corporate-specific duty to 
market duty, substantiated by the growing impact of modern finance theory on 
corporate law. As the last part (or lesson) demonstrates, by the turn of the 
twenty-first century, the cumulative impact of these changes left the law of 
directors’ duties muddled and increasingly immaterial. 
V.  DORMANT DUTIES—WHEN MARKETS AND FINANCE TRUMP LAW 
Having introduced, or reintroduced, the concept of good faith as a means 
of resurrecting the dormant duty of care, the Delaware courts were faced with 
the challenge of defining the duty to act in good faith. In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litigation offered a golden opportunity to address the matter.89 The 
key question in the case was whether Disney’s directors breached their duties 
by hiring Michael Ovitz as president and firing him fourteen months later with 
a severance package of roughly $130 million.90 Earlier in the litigation, the 
court dismissed the duty of loyalty claims.91 At the same time, Disney’s charter 
exempted directors from liability for breaches of the duty of care (pursuant to 
section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law).92 Resurrecting a 
separate good faith standard was the only means of imposing liability on the 
board of directors. Chancellor Chandler was skillful in crafting the standard, 
and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. According to Disney, a director 
might fail to act in good faith if he or she “intentionally acts with a purpose 
other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation[,] . . . acts with 
the intent to violate applicable positive law, or . . . intentionally fails to act in 
the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his 
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duties.”93 The latter possibility was particularly pertinent in Disney, but the 
court, even if reluctantly, determined that the Disney directors did not fail to 
fulfill their duty of good faith.94 
Stone v. Ritter, involving a duty to monitor, continued to develop the 
contours of good faith.95 The plaintiffs raised a “classic Caremark claim,” 
seeking to hold the directors of AmSouth Bancorporation liable for civil 
penalties assessed against the corporation “for operating an inadequate anti-
money-laundering program” and for failing to file Suspicious Activity Reports, 
as required by the Federal Bank Secrecy Act.96 Reinterpreting the Caremark 
standard after Disney, Justice Holland reiterated Disney’s definition of good 
faith.97 Yet, Holland determined that the obligation to act in good faith did not 
establish an independent fiduciary duty; rather, it was “a condition, ‘of the 
fundamental duty of loyalty.’”98 Diverging from long-standing precedent, 
including Caremark, that correctly treated the duty to monitor as a tort duty, 
diverging also from Disney that appropriately treated good faith as an 
independent duty, Stone made little conceptual sense. But, as my class 
concludes, it did not matter. The courts’ turn from tort and business practice to 
finance and the market made doctrine (and law) irrelevant. 
Justice Holland reiterated Caremark’s conclusion that the test of liability 
upheld in Stone—“lack of good faith as evidenced by sustained or systematic 
failure of a director to exercise reasonable oversight”—was “quite high.”99 In 
Stone, while the reporting system was insufficient and ineffective, the plaintiff 
shareholder failed to prove that the directors consciously disregarded their duty 
to monitor.100 Yet, according to the court, the high bar was in the shareholders’ 
best interests. Citing again to Caremark, the court noted that in making “board 
service by qualified persons more likely, while continuing to act as a stimulus 
to good faith performance of duty by such directors[,]” it ensured that 
shareholders would continue to profit.101 
In re Citigroup Shareholder Derivative Litigation came next.102 Citigroup, 
a global financial services company, suffered vast losses during the collapse of 
the housing market in 2008. In two years, Citigroup’s market capitalization 
was reduced from more than $240 billion to less than $20 billion, its stock 
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price plummeting. Many of these losses were associated with mortgage-backed 
securities and off-balance sheet assets.103 Citigroup’s shareholders brought an 
action against the company’s directors and officers alleging, among others, that 
the defendants breached their fiduciary duties by failing properly to monitor 
and manage the risks associated with the subprime lending market.104 
Writing for Delaware’s Chancery Court in the midst of the recession that 
followed the 2008 financial crisis, Chancellor Chandler held that Citigroup’s 
directors and officers did not breach their fiduciary obligations. Under 
Delaware law, Citigroup’s directors and officers could not be held liable for 
failing to monitor or, as Chandler described the allegations, making risky 
business decisions simply because their actions (or inactions) turned poor 
results (or financial crises).105 
Whether or not the plaintiffs raised a Caremark claim no longer mattered. 
Stone ensured that both actions and inactions of disinterested directors would 
be assessed using a good faith standard, now a subset of the duty of loyalty. 
“[O]ne can see a similarity between the standard for assessing oversight 
liability and the standard for assessing a disinterested director’s decision under 
the duty of care when the company has adopted an exculpatory provision 
pursuant to § 102(b)(7)[,]” Chandler wrote.106 To prevail in either case, a 
plaintiff would have to show that “a director consciously disregarded an 
obligation to be reasonably informed about the business and its risks or 
consciously disregarded the duty to monitor and oversee the business.”107 Like 
the shareholders in Graham, Caremark, and Stone, Citigroup’s shareholders 
did not meet the burden required to impose liability on their corporation’s 
directors. 
Yet, if Graham focused on business practice, Citigroup (following 
Caremark and Stone) grounded good faith—the little that was left of the 
disinterested director’s obligations—in finance. Risk, Chandler wrote, is “the 
chance that a return on an investment will be different tha[n] expected.”108 
From the perspective of finance, financial institutions, just like non-financial 
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corporations, “make returns by taking on risk.”109 In a world of “imperfect 
information, limited resources, and uncertain future,” the court would not, in 
hindsight, assess whether the directors “properly evaluated risk,” be it a risk 
involved in a business decision or investment.110 According to Chandler, to 
impose liability on directors “for making a ‘wrong’ business decision,” even if 
the decision involved monitoring, “would cripple their ability to earn returns 
for investors by taking business risks” and run against “bedrock principles of 
Delaware fiduciary duty law.”111 “Ultimately,” Chandler wrote, 
the discretion granted directors and managers allows them to maximize 
shareholder value in the long term by taking risks without the debilitating fear 
that they will be held personally liable if the company experiences losses. This 
doctrine also means, however, that when the company suffers losses, 
shareholders may not be able to hold the directors personally liable.112 
In the end, the conceptual coherence of Delaware’s duty to monitor was 
irrelevant. In relying on different standards to assess breaches of the duty to 
monitor—from negligence to business judgment to good faith and finance—
the Delaware courts legitimated the erosion, if not eradication, of the duty. 
My class concludes the discussion of directors’ duties by reflecting upon 
the importance of state corporate law to the development of business. The 
rapid growth of the stock market in the last decades of the twentieth century 
and the contentment of shareholders to place their funds in the hands of 
corporate managers whom corporate law have shielded from liability for 
potential harm to the corporation seem to indicate a lack of correlation between 
corporate law’s regulation of the corporation’s internal affairs and the 
development of our market economy. History, however, suggests otherwise. 
That none of the cases considered as milestones in the development of the duty 
to monitor held directors liable for breach of such duty speaks volumes about 
how the courts, especially the Delaware courts, view their role. By skillfully 
describing directors’ duties while holding that the directors did not breach their 
duties, the courts conveyed a consistent message to investors about the 
competency and diligence of their corporations’ directors and executives. 
Never finding directors and executives to have breached their duties, the courts 
helped pacify shareholders’ concerns. With detailed analyses of the role of the 
board, the appropriate standard to evaluate their duties, and the theories that 
grounded corporate law, the courts ensured that both the defendants and the 
plaintiffs had their day in court, thus legitimating the development of the 
publicly held corporation outside the court. 
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